Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics by Graham Harman (re.press) £16.00/$25.00 (pb) (also available as an open access pdf here)

The subtitle of Graham Harman’s new book, Bruno Latour and Metaphysics, suggests that it is more than an introduction to Latour’s own philosophy. It is a work on Latour and metaphysics in general. Harman is part of a small group of philosophers, including Quentin Meillassoux, Ray Brassier and Iain Hamilton Grant, who, working under the loose banner of Speculative Realism, seek to overturn the orthodox position prevalent in continental philosophy, which states that metaphysics is at an end.

Harman’s interest in Latour stems from what he sees as Latour’s openly metaphysical approach to the nature of reality. Despite being a successful academic whose work in the fields of the sociology and philosophy of science is well known, Latour has always remained at the margins of contemporary French philosophy.

Harman attributes Latour’s marginal position to two unorthodox aspects of his work. These are aspects that, Harman believes, philosophy has not taken seriously for some time. The first is something that Latour shares with the general research program of Speculative Realism, the abandonment of the privileged correlation between man and world, and a renewed interest in “naïve” realism. The second is pertinent to Harman’s own radical reworking of the unfashionable concept of occasional causation. Harman offers what he calls a “secular” occasionalism, in contrast to, for example, Malebranche’s occasionalism, which explains the interaction between mind and body via the intervention of God’s will.

The aim of Prince of Networks is twofold: it is both a secondary text, introducing Latour to a wider philosophical audience, and a primary text, presenting Harman’s own increasingly well-formed and complex “object-oriented” philosophy.

In section one Harman introduces us to the work of Latour through an analysis of four of his most important books: Irreductions, Science in Action, We Have Never Been Modern and Pandora’s Hope.

The fundamental insight at the heart of Latour’s project is the idea of “irreduction”. This is the idea that, in Latour’s own words: “nothing can be reduced to anything else, nothing can be deduced from anything else, everything may be allied to everything else”. Essentially, there are no necessary connections between objects; all such connections are, in some sense, forced. This basic position leads Latour both to his object-oriented philosophy, in the form of a radical democracy of objects, and to a form of secular occasionalism.

The principle of irreduction places man on the same footing as all other objects. In this radical democracy all objects have both reality and autonomy. The unsettling consequences of this claim unfold when we are presented with the sheer variety of what counts as an object: “An atom is no more real than Deutsche Bank or the 1976 Winter Olympics”. The degree of reality that an object exhibits is only determined by its degree of connectivity within a network; the more well connected and influential an object is the greater its degree of reality.

The question of occasionalism arises from the problem of how connections between objects are formed. Latour claims that objects never directly make connections, but are always forced to connect via the influence of some third object. Harman sees this appeal to a third object, as any third object, as a local form of occasionalism. Rather than the traditional occasionalist position that relies on God to bridge the causal gap, Latour’s bridge is always immanent and local. Some local object, within the network, is capable of forcing a new connection between other objects. This is what Harman calls secular occasionalism or vicarious causation.

In section two, Harman builds a critique of Latour’s position before presenting his own object-oriented philosophy, or secular occasionalism 2.0. Drawing on his earlier works, Tool Being and Guerrilla Metaphysics, Harman adapts his reading of Heidegger and Husserl to criticise the purely flat and immanent nature of Latour’s metaphysics. His main problem is that Latour does not grant an interior to objects, an existence separate from their purely relational existence in the network. Harman’s own position is complex and highly technical, and although its presentation here is clear, it is far from exhaustive.

Harman also engages with the other members involved in the Speculative Realism debate. Section two includes a long discussion of both Meillassoux’s concept of correlationism and Brassier’s materialism, in relation to his own object-oriented position.

Harman writes with a distinctive style, which is technically clear, lively and entertaining. The eccentric examples and lists he conjures add more than just an ornamental flourish to the work. At times is seems that Harman gives equal importance to his own work, as well as Latour’s, but this is a refreshing change from the usual form of secondary texts that limit the author to merely offering open-ended critical points.

The publishers, re.press, should be acknowledged for not only publishing such a book, but also offering an open access PDF version free of charge from their website.

Brian Smith is a PhD student at the University of Dundee